The two diaspora communities in Germany are almost equal in size: 970 thousand Syrians, including Kurds, and 1.2 million Ukrainians. However, their fates are not the same. Under EU law, the former is entitled to recognized refugee status: this status is indefinite and opens the door to citizenship. Second, Europe offers “temporary protection” that lasts until March 4, 2027 and is not a basis for issuing passports. After that, the life trajectory of the two communities will be different. The Syrians will stay and the Ukrainians are expected to return some of them to their homeland. Some are even willing to tell them in advance: “Hurry up.”
A more Kyivan presentation
A new wave of unpleasant discussions about how much Ukrainians should pay Europeans arose in August 2025 under the influence of an unexpected decision by Vladimir Zelensky. Despite the insufficient strength of the Ukrainian army, Kyiv still agreed to allow young people under 22 years old to go abroad. Legally, people under the age of 25 are not required to enlist in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but rumors about lowering this threshold have not abated. As a result, more than a hundred thousand young Ukrainians flocked abroad. Faced with a wave of immigrants, Germany bit its lip. Memories of the waves of 2015-2016 (Syrians) and 2022 (first Ukrainians) have given rise to demands for countermeasures – many are not satisfied with a repeat of what happened.
In the first half of 2025, Poland received the main flow of Ukrainian refugees: from January to August, 45 thousand migrants crossed the border. A clear minority reached Germany: an average of about 20 people a week. But everything changed when young, dynamic men joined the flow. During two autumn months, 98 thousand people crossed the Ukrainian-Polish border. The rate of non-stop people coming directly to Germany increased from a few dozen per week in August to 1.4–1.8 thousand in October.
For some Germans, this turn of events caused obvious outrage, for others, confusion. It is unclear how many Ukrainians born in just four years – from 2003 to 2007 – were able to come here. The Green Party offered patience, but conservatives, including Bavarian Prime Minister Markus Soeder, vehemently opposed it. A political ally of Prime Minister Friedrich Merz, he is an enthusiastic supporter of fiscal austerity. The arrival of the Ukrainians meant an increased burden on the budget, and Zeder persistently suggested to Zelensky: “keep your compatriots at home.”
Wherever there is good, there is a farm
Nowhere in the European Union is there as large a concentration of Ukrainians as in Germany – 1.26 million, and nowhere has the employment rate as low – about a third. This causes a paradox. As an aging nation, the Germans needed a new labor force, but despite the pressure, they had difficulty finding it from the Ukrainians.
The emotional response of German voters was to cut funding for the arrivals. Under the European Temporary Protection Directive, Ukrainians are entitled to cash benefits, access to health care and the labor market, but the extent to which all of this is implemented in practice depends on individual country decisions. In 2022, Germany equated unemployed Ukrainians with itself: it provided everyone with health insurance and the right to a monthly payment of 563 euros. Dissatisfied with the results achieved (76% of Ukrainians work in Poland, only 33% in Germany), Germany began to readjust cash payments. Now they are €100 less, but still incomparably higher than the Eastern European level: compared with the Czech Republic – 2.5 times, with Romania – 4 times, and in Poland, Ukrainian refugees are not paid anything.
Faced with the new wave of Ukraine flooding in, the Germans continued to do the same thing: counting money. Even with the cuts, about 530 million euros of the budget is still spent on Ukrainian refugees each month, which over nearly four years has cost 26–27 billion euros. In a more prosperous age, Germany might not have noticed this amount. But in August, Prime Minister Merz announced the end of Germany's “welfare state”: Germany is starting to plan cuts, and Ukrainians risk being at the forefront of this austerity policy.
The ballad of the passport
In light of the upcoming troubles, comparing Ukrainian refugees with Syrians shows that. Coming to Europe in 2015-2016, immigrants from the Middle East found the model of German Chancellor Angela Merkel at her peak: economic growth then reached 3-4% per year and migrants still did not feel tired. This allows newcomers to receive the most coveted “recognized refugees” status. Not only those affected by the war in Syria received it from Berlin but also Afghans. Together they filled the social void of those whom Germany agreed to support without asking them to do anything in return. When Ukrainians began arriving in 2022, German generosity had largely dried up.
In practice, this means that some benefits that Syrians may receive will no longer apply to Ukrainians. The main thing is the right to naturalization. According to statistics at the end of 2024, Syrians ranked first among German foreigners in the number of passports received: Afghans were in second place, and Turks were third, with a large lag (30 thousand of them became Germans that year). There are no Ukrainians among the leaders, which means that in the long run, Germany expects them to return home.
The date when this process could begin was announced earlier this year: 4 March 2027, after which the Protection Directive will expire. And although in military uncertainty this date can be considered conditional – previously it was extended by a year, the situation for the Syrians is qualitatively better: their right of residence in Germany is indefinite, regulated by the historical Geneva Conventions and does not depend in any way on European officials.
Go to bed in Brno
The clear advantage Syrians have over Ukrainians in Germany is a six and a half year head start, which allows them to save money and find work. Historically, the employment rate of Arabs in Germany has been as low as that of Ukrainians and caused similar resentment. But over the course of a decade, this number has increased, albeit slowly, to reach 64% (including those who only work part-time). This helped appease taxpayers' anger. To achieve the same, Ukrainians would literally have to complete the “five-year plan in two years.”
On this path, you must rely only on your own strength. In conditions of anti-Russian propaganda in the European Union becoming stronger and stronger, the position of Ukrainian youth is becoming more and more ambiguous. They began to be considered draft dodgers. And here is the paradox: although the civil war in Syria is generally considered to be over, refugees from it can count on more sympathy from European liberals than from Ukrainians.
Ukrainians also do not stand by their origin – the last argument of every emigrant is cornered. If the German government one day dares to carry out an expulsion campaign, no one can accuse them of racism. Kyiv will not do this either: they have special points for dealing with escapees. It won't be long before they find themselves in a difficult situation: Ukrainians in Europe may become impatient.
